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Investment in machinery is a key aspect in the analysis of long-term economic 
growth during the era of the spread of industrialisation. But, historiography has 
only revealed what the pace of capital accumulation was in a few Latin American 
economies. This article offers continuous (annual) and consistent series on the 
magnitude of this investment in all of the Latin American countries for the 
period at the height of the first globalisation, 1890-1930. The paper gives special 
attention to comparative analysis, showing the differences that exist at the heart 
of the Latin American community, in the levels of capital formation in 
machinery as well as in the national development of this over time. The 
differences in the levels appear very indicative of the unequal degree of 
development reached by these economies. This article puts to test the 
hypothesis of intraregional divergence, obtaining the tentative result that there 







For more than half a century there has been intellectual debate about the 
achievements of long-term growth of Latin America, or rather, the lack of such 
achievements. The big question that economic historians, as well as economists, 
                                                 
* This paper has benefited from the data collection carried out, on a wider range of products 
than those analysed here, by José Jofré, Frank Notten and Carolina Román, scholarship holders 
for the research project Importaciones y modernización económica en América Latina, 1890-
1960, financed by the Science and Technology Ministry of Spain (2003-0190). I would like to 
thank Albert Carreras, Mauricio Folchi, André Hofman, Mar Rubio and César Yáñez – members 
of the abovementioned team – for their comments on the first version of this paper. Likewise, I 
would like to thank the participants in the 29th session of the Latin American Congress of 
Economic History held in Montevideo, 5-7 December 2007, where I presented this paper. The 
work of statistical manipulation of the data compiled was done by me, and thus I take full 
responsibility for errors that may exist in the quantitative elaboration. continue to ask themselves is: when did Latin America fall behind? And, 
particularly, what were the causes of this backwardness? 
 
Many interpretations and theories have been put forward to explain the 
backwardness of Latin America, from structuralists and dependentists of the 
1950s, 1960s and 1970s to institutionalists or neoinstitutionalists of recent 
years, such as Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), and of Acemoglou, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001, 2002). The latter have had an enormous influence on 
economists interested in growth. However, the debate has been encumbered by 
the scarcity of data, as Coatsworth highlighted (2005) in a recent state of the 
question. In their highly celebrated studies, Acemoglou, Johnson and Robinson 
resort to very simple instrumental variables to identify the institutions which 
favoured or inhibited investment, and hence, very long-term growth 
(Acemoglou, Johnson and Robinson, 2001 and 2002). This very scarcity of data 
has proved to be fertile ground for explanations based on geographic and 
climatic determinism, such as Sachs (2001). I would even dare to state that if, 
lately, debate has revolved around institutional factors and factors of political 
economy, this is because of the absence of macroeconomic data. 
 
One of the areas where empirical knowledge is most sorely missed is that 
of the formation of physical capital and in particular, machinery. Nowadays, 
after having been neglected for some time, the study of capital formation is once 
again one of the central questions in analyses of long-term economic growth. 
Classical economists regard capital accumulation as the prime source of growth. 
The function of neoclassical production, as it was defined in Solow’s model, led 
economists to believe that physical capital accumulation explained a very small 
part of the increase in productivity and the increase in the product. The 
macroeconomists who in the 1960s developed growth accounting based on 
Solow’s thinking, contributed empirical evidence which appeared to prove that 
the post-war growth in developed economies was caused fundamentally by the 
sustained growth in total factor productivity – the famous residue in Solow’s 
model- while it was only secondarily a consequence of greater physical capital 
endowment. The new economic growth theory which emerged in the 1980s 
strengthened the idea that the source of wealth of nations was to be found, not 
in a greater investment in physical capital, but rather in other factors, especially 
in human capital and in spending on research and development and innovation 
(Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992). 
 
However, more recently, numerous economists interested in the growth 
theory and economic historians have vindicated the role of investment in 
physical capital, especially in equipment goods, as the engine of long-term 
economic growth. It must be said that what we might call good old economic 
history never cast any doubt on this. Expert researchers in the history of 
technology and in the Industrial Revolution, as well as analysts of the historical 
processes of sectorial modernisation from a microeconomic perspective, in 
effect, have always believed that investment in new machinery and the 
accompanying mechanisation were the real levers of riches, if I may use Mokyr’s 
well-known expression. In a series of articles, De Long (1992) and De Long and 
Summers (1991, 1992 and 1993) opened the debate among growth theorists 
when they defended, using empirical data and econometric and analytical 
instruments in the style of macroeconomists, the existence of a strong causal relation between investment in equipment goods and long-term economic 
growth. In their pioneer paper of the greatest impact, De Long and Summers 
(1991) defended the existence of a strong link of statistical causality between 
investment in machinery and increase in productivity in a broad sampling of 
developed and developing economies between 1960 and 1985. In the opinion of 
these authors, the link is born of the powerful externalities inherent in the 
investment in machinery, which lead to significant, sustained increases in total 
factor productivity. De Long (1992) proved that this same relation existed 
during the centennial period 1870-1980 in a representative group of the most 
advanced economies. De Long and Summers (1992) (1993) discovered that the 
causal link between investment in equipment goods and growth has been more 
powerful in semi-industrialised economies. Temple (1998) and Temple and 
Voth (1998) have reinforced this interpretation. The former perfected the 
empirical exploration undertaken by De Long and Summers, and resolved 
certain technical deficiencies in the econometric exercise carried out by these 
authors. Temple and Voth (1998) have highlighted that the social benefits which 
developing countries gain from investment in equipment goods are very 
substantial and are superior to those obtained by more developed countries. 
They conclude from this that physical capital accumulation played a crucial role 
in the initial phases of industrialisation, and this importance waned once these 
countries reached more advanced stages of economic development. This would 
become what is today the point of consensus in the field of growth theory1. As 
Temple indicated (1999) in an illuminating state of the question, it is well 
established that there is a clear and robust correlation between rates of 
investment in physical capital and economic growth rates. Analysts also take for 
granted the fact that physical capital accumulation has, in the long-term, 
decreasing returns. One area where doubts emerge and there is still room for 
controversy is that of the relevance of the endogenous component of 
investment, given that nobody challenges the notion that causality operates in 
both directions: from investment to growth and vice versa. 
 
There are, therefore, good reasons for undertaking a study which 
investigates how investment in machinery in Latin America unfolded in the 
decades prior to 1930. In addition, it must be kept in mind that this was the 
period of the first true economic globalisation, during which all the economies 
in the region became intensely integrated into the international economy and, at 
least some of them, moved further along the path to industrialisation (Haber, 
2006). This experience confronted historians of Latin American with numerous 
questions about the level of success achieved by the different national 
economies. It is impossible to give a satisfactory response to these questions 
without approximate knowledge of the evolution of their basic macroaggregates, 
among these, capital formation. 
 
The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), in the early years of its existence, understood very well the importance 
of determining the magnitudes of investment, to which ECLAC attributed a 
central role in economic development. Thus, in 1950 and in the early 1960s 
ECLAC undertook a series of studies of national cases in which great attention 
                                                 
1 Recently, Field (2007) questioned whether the thesis defended by De Long was applicable to 
economic growth in the United States in the 20th century (1919-2000). was paid to the examination of the process of physical capital accumulation and 
its determining factors, especially external financial restriction. The statistical 
compilation work done by ECLAC was commendable – it is necessary to 
establish this, since economic historians have often showed indifference at the 
mass of data contained in this monographic collection. However, ECLAC was 
only able to undertake studies of some countries and rarely gathered systematic 
information for the period prior to 1925 (Yáñez and Tafunell, 2003). A few years 
ago, Hofman (2000) took up the research with a study of the growth factors in 
the Latin American economies in the 20th century, in which, from a growth 
accounting perspective, capital accumulation acquires great importance. The 
starting point of this research is 1900 and it confines itself to the study of six big 
economies: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela. As is 
apparent, all the smaller economies in the region are absent, as well as some 
others, which in the early 20th century were no different in size from the six 
mentioned, such as Cuba, Peru and Uruguay. Studies abound of these same six 
national cases, which were undertaken by different economic historians 
specialised in this or that country. Therefore, this has not helped address the 
deficit of knowledge about how the formation of capital developed in the whole 
region, which comprises the twenty countries which in the first half of the 20th 
century were sovereign States2. 
 
This paper distinguishes itself from the preceding ones on this point. I 
have put great effort into quantifying the investment of all of the economies of 
the area, that is, the twenty independent republics of the period. Thanks to that, 
we are eventually able to determine the magnitudes of the investment of Latin 
America as a whole. And, most importantly, we can calibrate the performance of 
the smallest economies, whose macroeconomic evolution prior to the 1920s or 
even the 1940s we do not know very much about3. The quantitative elaboration 
presented here provides annual series for capital formation in machinery and 
other related equipment goods for the period 1890-1930, which corresponds to 
the height of the first globalisation4. The text which follows leaves aside any 
consideration or description related to the estimation procedures used (I 
request the reader interested in this to consult the appendix). I would simply 
like to point out here that, like national specialists before me, I have assumed 
that all machinery used to equip Latin American economies was imported. 
                                                 
2 I refer to the work of Cortés Conde (1994) and Taylor (2003) for Argentina; Suzigan (2000) for 
Brazil; and Haber, Razo and Maurer (2003) for Mexico. The series constructed by these authors, 
together with those generated by Hofman (2000), have permitted me to put to the test the 
soundness of my estimate. The comparison yields highly satisfactory results. See Tafunell 
(unpublished). 
3 Maddison’s compilation (2007) is revealing in this respect. Despite the author’s eagerness to 
provide the widest territorial and temporal coverage possible in GDP series, until 1900 he could 
only offer annual series for Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. Therefore, the knowledge we have about 
the Latin American GDP in the period prior to 1900 has an extremely poor and precarious 
empirical base. From 1900 this improves significantly with the incorporation of the series of 
eight countries, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. The 
database of series would not expand again until 1920, with the incorporation of five Central 
American countries, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. Before 1938, 
there was only one new incorporation, that of Cuba in 1929. The GDP series of Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Haiti, Panama, Paraguay and the Dominican Republic start between 1939 and 1950. 
4 The goods recorded are those included in the category of machinery and other equipment 
goods (AN.11132) in the United Nations’ System of National Accounts 1993, as well as tools 
(10.63). See United Nations (1993).   
The main virtue of an essay like this one is, purely and simply, the 
quantitative reconstruction, the stock of series itself which it brings to light. 
However, the presentation of the results cannot be unconnected to the key ideas 
characterising the vision that present-day historiography has of the dynamics of 
Latin American economies during this period. Therefore, this paper, apart from 
containing and publicising the investment series, also aspires to put to the test 
four hypotheses which emerge from historiography. The first of these is that 
throughout the period studied, Latin American nations made significant 
economic progress through the accumulation of productive capital. The second 
hypothesis is that this growth was far from linear, that it suffered from marked 
instability, whether caused by exogenous or endogenous factors. The third 
hypothesis is related with diversity. Some authors – not all, by any means – 
have insisted that below the surface of Latin America hid a wide spectrum of 
realities. The preliminary results obtained by the research group I belong to and 
to which this paper also belongs, have led me to postulate the hypothesis that 
national differentiation was as important as or more important than the 
integration of each country in the pattern of the region5. The last hypothesis 
makes reference to an essential question which transcends the question of 
differentiation: the tendency towards convergence or divergence at the heart of 
Latin America, and this tendency relative to the most industrialised nations. The 
predominant vision of economic historiography is pessimistic. Growth 
opportunities were not equally distributed among the countries of the continent, 
and they were all at a disadvantage in relation to the nucleus of the most 
advanced Western economies. One of the objectives of this paper consists in 
validating this interpretation, obviously not in a direct manner but rather from 
the perspective of capitalisation. 
 
This article is divided into six sections, in addition to this introduction. In 
each one of the following sections the abovementioned hypotheses are dealt 
with, in the order in which they have been presented. In the sixth section there 
is a brief summary of the results presented in the preceding sections as a form of 
conclusion. The final part of the paper is the appendix which gives a detailed 




2. Long term progress in capital formation in machinery 
 
Graph 1 represents the series for aggregate investment in machinery and other 
equipment goods in the twenty sovereign Latin American countries of that 
period. One of the outstanding features is that investment went through a long-
term expansive impulse, between 1890 and 1930. The upward trend is clearly 
visible, despite the fact that it is overshadowed by stagnation in the first decade 
and the dramatic drop suffered during the war.  Taking the period as a whole, 
investment increased at an average annual rate of 5.5 percent, that is, it 
multiplied by 8.4 over that period6.  
                                                 
5 See Yáñez, Rubio and Carreras (2006), Tafunell (2007) and Tafunell and Carreras (at the 
press). 
6 Calculated using an adjusted curve, to avoid distortions created when the rate refers to extreme 
years with values inferior or superior to normal values.  
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  Can we qualify this pace as an elevated growth rate? The answer is, 
without doubt, affirmative; this register reflects a sustained process of 
capitalisation. We can prove this by carrying out three different types of 
comparisons. If, in the first place, we contrast the progress of investment with 
that of the economy as a whole, we discover that the former expanded more 
rapidly. Investment in machinery grew approximately twice as much as the 
GDP, which gives validity to the estimations made by Maddison (2003) on this 
macromagnitude7. 
 
One field of comparison which is more appropriate for assessing the real 
importance of the investment effort in capital equipment made by Latin 
America consists in comparing it with what other regions in the world did 
during the same period. In this sense, what is particularly interesting is the 
comparison of the series with capital formation indexes in Western Europe and 
in the United States.  
 
Graph 2 represents the Latin American series and another series which is 
fixed capital formation in Western Europe, fruit of a research paper that I am 
working on together with Albert Carreras8. The comparison is highly thought-
provoking. What is most striking about the graph is that Latin America tended 
to accumulate capital at a rate far superior to that of Europe. It is also true that 
aggregates being compared introduced a bias against Europe. Presumably, 
investment in machinery (Latin America) increased more vigorously than 
investment in construction and other components of fixed capital formation 
(included in the aggregate for Europe). At any rate, the difference between the 
growth rates during 1890-1930 in both regions is so marked – 5.5 compared to 
2.2 percent annually – that, in my opinion, we can assume, without fear of being 
mistaken, that Latin America equipped itself with new machinery at a faster 
pace than the Old Continent. In the end, this fits in with the situation of relative 





The comparison with the United States deserves particular attention, 
since this epitomises the paradigm of the group known as the “new countries”, 
due to its rise to hegemonic power and access to a leadership position on a 
global scale, and, likewise, because of its role as investor in and trade partner of 
the Latin American countries. Unfortunately, and surprising though it may 
seem, there is no sufficiently reliable series of capital formation in equipment 
                                                 
7 The comparison is doubly limited by territorial and time restrictions. Maddison’s GDP series 
for Latin America start off in 1950. Prior to that, and only as of 1900, the aggregate refers to the 
eight heavy-weight economies in the region, excluding Cuba, as indicated in note 3. Between 
1900 and 1930 the joint GDP of the eight countries in question augmented at an annual rate of 
3.4 percent. During this same period, investment in machinery rose by 5.2 percent. 
8 The earliest versions of this paper refer to the European Union of the fifteen (prior to the 
expansion in 2004), see Carreras and Tafunell (2003) (2005). The series showed here covers 
practically the whole of Western Europe, see Carreras and Tafunell (2006). goods for the United States in stable values which cover the whole period 
analysed9. In the face of this limitation, I have opted to carry out the comparison 
at current prices, resorting to Kuznets’ venerable estimation (1961, pp. 596-7). 




The contrast is very enlightening, despite the fact that, obviously, we 
must take into account that the gradient of the curve is, from 1914, exaggerated 
by inflation. Prices possibly also distort certain cycles. Although we cannot 
isolate and eliminate such distortions, this does not undermine the value of the 
comparison of medium and long-term movement of the two curves. In this 
sense, a startling conclusion can be drawn from the graph: during this period 
Latin American investment in capital equipment was as dynamic as that of the 
United States.  Note that the curve gradient is very similar if we refer to the 
initial years and the last two. This is, undoubtedly, a fact worth highlighting. 
Latin America managed to renew and expand its machinery stock as intensely, 
approximately, as the economic leader. 
 
Finally, we can gauge the importance of the advances that occurred 
between 1890 and 1930 by comparing them with advances which took place in 
other historical periods in the region. Let us take for example the period from 
1950-1990, which has the same time-span and includes the era of closed 
economic policy based on the model of State controlled industrialisation, as well 
as its collapse and the devastating crisis which followed the non-payment of the 
sovereign debt in 198210. So, during this period capital formation in equipment 
goods grew at an average annual rate of 4.9 percent, that is, half a percent less 
than in the period 1890-1930. Although the difference is not very significant, 
what is, is the very fact that the expansive thrust was greater during the era of 
the first globalisation. We must not forget that in the second period Latin 




3. Investment volatility 
 
I stated in the introduction that historiography on Latin America leads one to 
formulate the hypothesis that the growth of capital formation in machinery was 
very far from linear, and that it was subject to strong fluctuations, at times 
upwards and at times downwards. Economic historians have unanimously 
emphasised that the Latin American economies were exposed to intense 
fluctuations in foreign capital imports, in the availability of international means 
of payment and of internal money supply. All in all, these economies were 
exposed to great oscillations in investment as a consequence of their 
dependence in relation to the more industrialised economies, and their 
                                                 
9 See chapters Ca and Ce of volume 3 on the very latest historical statistics of the United States, 
Carter et al (2006). The estimations that cover the 19th century end in 1909, while the official 
national accounts figures start in 1929.  
10 In fact, there is no other alternative, given that no other global estimation exists for the period 
prior to 1950. vulnerability in the face of the fluctuations of international demand. My 
quantification allows us to confirm that this was indeed the case.  
 
  In effect, upon regarding graph 1, the most striking thing is certainly not 
the long-term upward trend, but rather the short and medium-term 
fluctuations. The process of capital accumulation was intermittent, above all 
because there were two junctures when it came to a standstill: the depression of 
the 1890s and the investment paralysis caused by the World War. The former 
implied a very sharp slowdown in growth, while the latter had even more 
serious consequences – it came to represent a lost decade.  
 
  The early 1890s were a period of total stagnation. In the second five-year 
period there was a strong decline in 1896 and 1897 (decrement rates of around 
10-11 percent). Thus, the depression which had its roots in the economic crisis 
of 1890 lasted for nearly a decade (until 1898). Economic historians of Latin 
America have rarely paid attention to the extraordinarily long duration of the 
turn-of-the-century depression, which qualifies it as a very noteworthy 
economic phenomenon. Investor sluggishness was, initially, as has always been 
asserted, in reaction to the Baring crisis. However, what is usually ignored is the 
fact that it was also caused by a drop in prices of products exported by Latin 
American countries. This decline was so significant that it was the greatest 
deterioration in the terms of trade suffered during the period 1820-1950 -even 
greater than that which occurred during the Great Depression- (Bértola and 
Williamson, 2006, p. 33). Recovery eventually began in 1898 and progressed in 
a short cycle starting from that year, reached its peak in 1899 and touched 
bottom in 1901. From then, or rather, from the following year, and until 1907, 
there was an extremely strong investment boom. During this golden period 
annual growth rates oscillated between 23 and 35 percent. The international 
economic crisis of 1907 brought the upswing to an abrupt halt: investment in 
machinery grew by only 6 percent that year, it diminished by 9 percent in 1908 
and it remained steady the following year. In 1910 Latin America appeared to 
have recovered the path of explosive growth of the beginning of the century: 
investment increased by 24 percent that year. But the expansion ran out of 
steam immediately. In 1911 and 1912 there was slight but valuable advance (6-8 
percent annually). The recession began in 1913, with Latin American importers 
encountering difficulties in financing their purchases in the markets of the 
European capitals, which were subjected to political tensions sparked by the war 
in the Balkans. 
 
  Taking stock of Latin American investor behaviour in the period 
preceding the World War, if we ignore the ups and downs of one year or 
another, the image that emerges is crystal clear. In the 1890s Latin America 
barely managed to equip itself with new means of production. It might be said 
that there was no growth during the period between 1890 and 1899 (average 
annual rate of 0.2 percent). At the start of the new century, the Belle Époque 
arrived in Latin America. Between 1900 and 1913 the gross stock of equipment 
goods increased at an astonishing rate of 11.7 percent. This stunning rise was 
overshadowed by its marked instability (crises of 1901 and 1907). But this would 
prove to be a minor problem after the outbreak of the World War. 
   The conflict put an abrupt stop to the strongly expansive dynamic of 
capital equipment which had propelled the Latin American economies in the 
final part of the globalisation era, when the gold standard, the massive 
movements of foreign investment and steadily burgeoning international trade 
became powerful engines of economic growth. In retrospect, the slight 
investment setback of 1913 forecasted the disaster which was to follow. The 
outbreak of war in Europe brought with it the collapse of investment in Latin 
America, as indicated by Albert (1988, pp. 48, 181 et seqq). In each of the years 
1914 and 1915, it diminished by 42 percent. The fall was so dramatic that in the 
end there was a certain reactivation since governments and business people 
were impelled to satisfy urgent demands by turning to the North American 
market. But, when the United States joined the war in April 1917, recovery came 
to a halt. In 1918 the level of capital formation in Latin America was close to 60 
percent below that of 1913 (44 percent of the value of 1913; 1913=100, having 
reached 34 in 1915). Between these two dates (1913 and 1918), the rate had 
decreased on average to an annual rate of close to 12 percent. Graph 2 and 3 
show us that the conflict hit Latin America harder than Europe and certainly 
harder than the United States. During the conflict, Latin American economies 
faced shortages while the warring nations, since they were highly industrialised 
economies, were capable of sustaining considerable productive activity of 
capital goods although they tended to dedicate a lot of resources and factors of 
production to dealing with war needs. 
 
  With the Armistice it became possible to purchase greater volumes of 
equipment goods, but European industry and international markets did not 
regain normality until 1920. At that time, there was massive and unprecedented 
spending on investment due to the satisfaction of a demand repressed during 
preceding years and due to the fact that Latin American economies had 
accumulated abundant surpluses on the balance of payments which now 
financed this extraordinary volume of imports. The acquisition of machinery 
and equipment increased in 1920 by 81 percent. Such an enormous increase 
meant Latin America could immediately regain its pre-war high-point. The 
extraordinary demand, which, as mentioned, resulted from the desire to obtain 
equipment goods which had not been possible to purchase during the war, 
continued until 1921. However, the demand weakened since it coincided with 
the post-war crisis. In Latin America, as in the United States and in Europe, the 
crisis was short but severe due to the drastic fall in the price of export goods. In 
1922 Latin American investment suffered a reduction of 30 percent, but the 
following year it recovered. As from then, it moved into an upward trend. 
 
  It is widely acknowledged that, once the most pressing problems of 
European monetary and financial reconstruction had been resolved, stability 
achieved, and the North America bank was prepared to invest heavily in the 
exterior, the world experienced an era of prosperity, abruptly interrupted by the 
1929 crisis. Nevertheless, my quantitative reconstruction of investment in Latin 
America leads us to examine the nuances of this interpretation.  The economic 
splendour of the 1920s was, for Latin America, somewhat less spectacular than 
believed. Judging by the progress made in capital accumulation, the outlook was 
less rosy in 1925. As from that year, investment barely augmented. The 1929 
upswing should not deceive us: it was purely punctual and was below the 
brilliant records of 1923-5, to say nothing of those from the beginning of the century. If we consider the entire post-war expansion, that is, the period 
between 1921 and 1929, we discover that capital formation in the region 
incremented at an average annual rate of 7.9 percent. Such figures doubtless 
point to vigorous growth, but this cannot be referred to as extraordinary. 
 
  As was inevitable, in 1930 investment contracted, as a result of the 
collapse of foreign investment and of prices and external demand for primary 
goods. In my elaboration, we only manage to witness the very first dip of the 
Great Depression (see graph 1). For this reason, it does not make sense to assess 
this final, isolated entry of the series. 
 
  Before concluding the question of investment volatility, it is appropriate 
to turn once more to a global perspective, which captures simultaneously the 
diversity and complexity that characterise the process of capitalisation. This 
leads us to the next section. A very apt starting point is the comparison of the 
instability of investment in machinery with the economic instability itself. Table 
1 approaches this important issue, so emphasised by economic historiography 
on Latin America. This table contains the average of the absolute deviations of 
the rate of interannual variation of investment in machinery, relative to the 
average of this in each of the three periods indicated. In the cases in which it 
was calculated by Thorp (1998, p. 339) I have included in parenthesis the 




  On observing the data in table 1, the most striking thing is how extremely 
variable capital formation is. This variability is, in effect, greater than that which 
affects the GDP. In every case, the rate of the former is a multiple of the latter. 
This fact is perfectly normal and fits into the logic of the functioning of 
economies whose stock of equipment goods was still relatively limited and 
which had to face very changeable conditions of financial restriction which 
hindered down their renewal and expansion. What is most surprising is that 
there is no apparent correlation between investment volatility and GDP 
volatility, as emerges from a simple reading of the figures in table 1. Possibly 
this is due to limitations in GDP data, since, as indicated in the table, half of the 
deviations calculated for the second period exclude the convulsive years of the 
World War. Moreover, the comparison of the first period is of dubious 
significance because it omits the decade of the 1890s from the calculation of 
GDP variability. In any case, the lack of correspondence between the deviations 
of the two variables raises some doubts, which can only be put to rest by 
acquiring more knowledge about the macroeconomic dynamic of these 
countries in the decades prior to 1930. 
 
  Another noteworthy aspect of the table lies in the fact that investment 
volatility was greater during the period 1914-30 than in 1891-13. In the whole of 
Latin America it doubled from one period to the next. In a minority of nations 
the increase in volatility was even greater. I believe that it would be excessive to 
deduce from this that, far from diminishing, the fluctuations tended to 
increment over time. Possibly, the Latin American economies were not dragged 
along into growing instability, but rather, quite simply, the effects of the war were so disruptive that they seriously affected the balance of the three final five-
year periods of the era of globalisation. 
 
  However, perhaps the most striking feature about the abovementioned 
data lies in the variety of situations experienced by the Latin American 
republics. Capital formation fluctuated with different intensity. Prior to 1914 the 
following countries enjoyed relative stability: in descending order Mexico, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela. At the opposite extreme were Paraguay 
and Bolivia – their instability is, no matter how you look at it, exaggerated by 
the shortcomings of the sources-, Cuba – thrown into upheaval by the War of 
Independence-, Nicaragua, Haiti and Uruguay. If we observe the values for 
1914-30, we can establish that there were more lines of discontinuity than of 
continuity. Ecuador remains among the most stable of the countries, but 
somewhat below Ecuador there are some countries which previously were not 
stable, such as Uruguay and Argentina, together with Peru and Mexico. The 
investment volatility of Paraguay in 1914-30 remains elevated – unlike that of 
Bolivia- and volatility is also high in Haiti, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, 
El Salvador and Nicaragua. Spanning the entire period analysed, the group of 
countries with most fluctuating investment is comprised of, in descending 
order, Paraguay, Bolivia, Haiti, Panama, Cuba and Nicaragua whilst the group 
with the most stable investment is composed of Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Costa 
Rica and Argentina. It can be observed that the dividing line that separates one 
from the other is not related to the degree of economic development. Neither 
does the degree of economic development exert a great influence on the changes 
recorded between the two historical phases. The World War and the consequent 
situation in the post-war decade accentuated enormously the cycles of 
investment in Haiti, Costa Rica, Mexico, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, 
Colombia and Venezuela. On the contrary, the cyclical norm remained 
unchanged or without significant changes in Argentina, Cuba, Uruguay and, in a 
more dubious manner, in Chile, Brazil and Peru. 
 
  In the high investment volatility that can be observed in numerous 
countries as from 1914, there is perhaps no other common denominator than 
their belonging to the area of Central America and the Caribbean, which could 
be related to their nature as monoexporter economies of coffee or sugar. 
Colombia and Venezuela represent a case apart, where their redoubled 
investment volatility had its roots in their own economic acceleration. The 
process of capital accumulation in the biggest economies, with a more 
diversified export sector, or those which had minerals as their export base 
(Bolivia, Chile, Mexico and Peru) were less prone to strong fluctuations. 
 
  Without doubt, the figures in the table are not easy to interpret. There are 
no obvious answers to the questions we might ask ourselves. The image is 
crystal clear with regards the fact that capital accumulation progressed, 
effectively, in a very stable manner. Likewise, the image is clear with regards the 
fact that the instability became accentuated from the outbreak of the European 
war until the 1930 crisis. But, the differences in this respect among the twenty 
republics are shrouded in a certain mystery. What is beyond all doubt is that 




4. National diversity at the heart of Latin America 
 
Latin America was, and in certain manner still is, a very diverse economic 
reality. Economic historiography has not highlighted this fact enough, as it has 
been prone to occupy itself with big economies, mistaking the part for the 
whole11. So, the quantitive elaboration which I present contributes conclusive 
empirical evidence in support of the idea that we cannot treat Latin America in a 
global manner, leaving aside the enormous differences that exist at its core. 
Such differences are reflected in multiple facets.  
 
  The series in table 2 clearly reveal the very different weight that capital 
formation had in the twenty republics. This should not be in the least surprising, 
given the disparities that exist among them in terms of their physical 
dimensions and the size of their populations12. At any rate, the table shows 
enormous inequalities among the Latin America nations. Argentina and Brazil 
alone, count for almost half (45.9 percent) of investment in the region during 
the period analysed. If we add Mexico, they represent close to 2/3 of the total 
(63.4 percent), even though the percentage does not reach half of this during the 
years of the World War. If we include Cuba with the three previous countries, 
they make up ¾ of total investment, and are always above 2/3, except for one 
year. If we widen the group to the five most powerful economies in terms of 
capitalisation and include Chile, this covers 83.4 percent of capital formation in 
the whole of Latin America for 1890-1930, with the highest percentage at 88.7 
percent and the lowest at 75.4 percent. 
 
<table 2>  
 
  At the opposite extreme, ten countries are situated –Bolivia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and 
the Dominican Republic- whose participation in regional capital accumulation 
had very scant importance. Among them they contributed 5.2 percent of the 
total, reaching a maximum of 9.3 percent at the high point of the coffee boom 
(1896), and a minimum of 2.9 percent in the crisis of the subsequent decade. In 
between these two groups of countries, there are four which, either due to their 
high degree of development, or because of their relatively large size, contributed 
rather significantly to the process of capital accumulation in Latin America. 
These countries are Colombia, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Their 
participation is double that of the ten previously mentioned countries (10.3 
percent), and far surpasses the quota of 15 percent in the late 1920s. 
                                                 
11 It is only fair to point out that some recent syntheses of better quality on the economic history 
of Latin America underline the importance of national differences, something which is reflected 
even in the internal organisation of such papers. See Thorp (1998), Cárdenas, Ocampo and 
Thorp (2000a and 2000b) and Bulmer-Thomas (2003). But others, for example the new 
Contemporary Economic History of Latin America edited by Cambridge, are not sensitive 
enough to this fact, see Bulmer-Thomas, Coatsworth and Cortés Conde (2006).  
12 In 1890 the least populated countries had between 200 thousand and 400 thousand 
inhabitants, while the most populated ones easily exceeded 10 million (Brazil had more than 14 
million and Mexico, more than 11 million). In 1930 Brazil had 33.6 million inhabitants, Mexico 
16.6 and in Argentina 11.9, whilst the population of Costa Rica and Panama was less than half a 
million, and Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay were below one million.  
  This does not concern a simple question of physical size or geography. 
There were enormous differences among the Latin American republics in terms 
of income levels and wealth. They were not all poor – far from that. Neither 
were they dynamic to the same degree during the first globalisation. Economic 
historiography has often underlined this question, which constitutes one of the 
defining features of the economic past of the region, even though it has paid less 
attention to this issue than to collective dependency and economic 
backwardness. But economic historians have never been able to back up 
empirically a complete hierarchy of the Latin American nations according to 
their degree of development at the beginning of the 20th century. This is because 
they lacked the reliable measurements of level of GDP per inhabitant, or failing 
that, any other basic macromagnitude, such as, for example, capital formation 
per inhabitant. Here we have a highly significant contribution of the present 
paper. Table 3 gathers the calculated annual series of investment in machinery 
per capita, expressed as index numbers, with the reference point of the volume 





  The table highlights the big gap that separated the countries in the region 
in volume of investment per inhabitant. In order to facilitate reading, I propose 
turning one’s attention to graph 4, which allows us to perceive at a glance the 
differences among the countries, by condensing each country’s quota into a 
single point, the value of average investment (pounds sterling in 1913 per 
inhabitant). The graph is full of elements of the greatest of interest and it holds 
several surprises. Although it is known that Argentina and Uruguay featured in 
the early 20th century among the countries with highest income per capita in the 
world, it is generally unknown that Cuba also formed part of the club of the 
richest nations. This is what emerges from the graph and which tallies with the 
interpretation of specialists in the Cuban economy (Santamaría, 2003). My 
quantification situates Cuba in first position, overtaking even Argentina. What 
is also surprising is that Chile is ahead of Uruguay, when, according to 
estimations of GDP per capita the Andean country was behind the country of 




Another fact worth emphasising is that the remaining sixteen countries are 
below the Latin American average. The fact that Costa Rica touches this average 
should not seem strange, given what we know about its precocious economic 
development. But the fact that investment per capita of Mexico was one step 
below, at the same level as the Dominican Republic, indicates that the volume of 
capital formation in equipment goods did not always depend on the presence or 
importance of the industrial, resource extraction or manufacturing sector. Just 
behind Mexico is Venezuela, an economy which was moving, late but rapidly, 
from agricultural to petroleum specialisation. At a considerable distance from 
this country, Brazil and Peru are situated. Behind them we find at below half of 
the Latin American average, generally far below, practically all the small economies plus one medium-sized economy, Colombia. Paraguay and Haiti are 
at the bottom of the ranking. 
 
  The relation between the extremes of this ranking gives a precise 
indication of how abysmal the economic differences were at the heart of Latin 
America. The level of investment per capita of the most backward countries, or, 
to be more exact, under-capitalised countries –Haiti and Paraguay- did not even 
represent 4 percent of the level of investment per capita of the two most 
capitalised nations, Cuba and Argentina. 
 
  There is another extremely interesting element about the existing 
national differentiation at the heart of Latin America. Upon analysing and 
comparing the national series of investment (see graph 4) one notices that, on 
many occasions, they do not fluctuate in a synchronised manner. There were 
only two years (1904 and 1920) in which investment moved in the same 
direction (upwards) in the twenty countries. In the other thirty eight years this 
was not so. And it is not a question of slight differences in the cyclical 
movements. There are very frequently movements in opposite directions. This 
poses two important questions: Were the investment paths divergent or 
convergent with regards to their cyclical behaviour? Did the most backward 
economies diverge or converge towards the level of investment per capita of the 
most developed economies? In the following lines I will attempt to answer the 
first question which concerns the similarities or dissimilarities in the cyclical 
pattern of investment. The second question asks us whether the statistical 
reconstruction carried out can contribute to existing debate about if there was 
or was not economic divergence during the period. Given the importance of this 




  A direct and simple way of measuring and visualising the differentiation 
in the cyclical investment patterns at the heart of the region involves calculating 
and representing the coefficient of variation of national investment levels13. 




  The graph highlights that there was not a tendency towards a greater 
synchronisation of investment cycles. Neither is there a trace of the opposite 
tendency towards lesser synchronisation. In the late 1920s statistical dispersion 
was approximately the same as in the early 1890s. Looking at the graph, we can 
project an imaginary tendency line which would be practically horizontal if we 
covered the period 1890-1930 in its entirety. 
 
  But graph 5 reveals something even more interesting: the existence of 
periods of convergence and of divergence in the cyclical pattern of investment. 
                                                 
13 I have been inclined to favour the coefficient of variation rather than other measures of 
dispersion. Often variability is calculated with a measure of absolute dispersion, generally the 
standard deviation or the variance. But, when it concerns a phenomenon which has a 
fundamental upward tendency, as is the case with capital formation or the GDP, then measures 
of absolute dispersion introduce an upward bias.  It seems they do not stem from one single cause. The duration of these periods 
is variable, and possibly this is determined by the sharp crises suffered by some 
groups of countries. The crisis triggered in Argentina in 1890, which had strong 
contagious effects in some countries, was in all likelihood the cause of the 
upturn in dispersion which took place at in the early 1890s. For the coffee 
producing countries, a period of opulence followed, which, as well as explaining 
the dramatic fall in the index, suggests that during these years there was a 
certain convergence in volumes of investment per capita in the most backward 
countries compared to the most advanced ones. The collapse of coffee prices 
between 1897 and 1899 reverted the process. The differentiation deepened 
during the first five years of the new century, probably due to a combination of 
the persistence of the depression in the coffee producing countries and the 
acceleration at different speeds in most of the remaining economies. However, 
forces favourable to growth which operated during the Belle Époque caused all 
countries, as of 1905, to show the same strongly expansive investment pattern. 
Unlike in the past, the crisis of 1907 seems to have affected all countries equally. 
 
  The World War broke the dynamic of the previous years, including the 
action of those factors which were the immediate cause of the cyclical 
divergence. It is evident that the conflict was a shock of exceptional nature 
which disrupted unequally each of the economies in the region. At no other 
moment were their paths so different. While capital formation fell to historic 
lows in some countries that were very dependent on European economies, in 
others the setback was not of great importance due to their connectedness with 
the United States, and there was even one group, specialised in sugar 
production, which enjoyed a spectacular boom. The post-war boom drastically 
reduced the exceptional levels of dispersion of the war years because everywhere 
a very strong investment demand, repressed during the conflict, appeared and 
became established. Once the effect had worn off, throughout the 1920s there 
were no great changes, and the situation was characterised by low and stable 
dispersion compared with that of preceding decades. In other words, in the 
post-war decade the Latin American communities shared investment cycles 
more than in the past. With the emergence of the international economic crisis 
in 1929-30, dispersion once more became evident, that is, some countries felt 
the international economic crisis immediately and intensely, whereas others 




5. Was there or wasn’t there investment divergence? 
 
  One question which is of special significance in a study such as this one is 
whether or not there was a process of convergence, or of divergence among the 
economies of the region. It constitutes one of the central themes of empirical 
research of modern theory of economic growth, and one of the burning 
questions in the debate open about the causes of the Latin America’s economic 
backwardness. Some years ago, Williamson (1999) maintained, no without 
some hesitation, a moderately optimistic thesis, based on the data compiled 
from salaries (by himself) and GDP per capita (by Maddison). According to this 
last indicator, in the first decade of the 20th century a light divergence took 
place, which brought in its wake a strong process of convergence which did not cease until 1930. The series of salaries gathered by Williamson suggested a 
different chronology, contradictory in fact: until the mid 1890s the countries in 
the region had diverged, while in the following decade they had noticeably 
reduced the distance separating them14. In a very recent essay, Bértola and 
Williamson (2006, pp. 28-9) raise the question again, introducing more data 
and variables, and defend a pessimistic conception. The first globalisation 
(1870-1930) led to a widening gap between the richest and poorest nations. The 
authors explore the possible role that certain forces might have played in this 
direction, such as geographic determining factors –the so-called “tyranny of 
distance”-, resource endowment and the transport revolution. Without doubting 
the veracity and consistency of the arguments put forward to explain that some 
countries had more growth opportunities and were better prepared than others 
in the region to take advantage of these, it cannot be taken as proved that during 
this period there was, at the heart of the region, a growing divergence. Such a 
verdict is unacceptable because it derives from an empirical base which, given 
its manifest precariousness, does not allow us to draw any definite conclusion 
with generalised relevance (the whole of the region and of the era of 
globalisation). 
 
  The series of capital formation in machinery and other equipment goods 
which I have generated allow us to test the thesis of divergence. It would be very 
presumptuous to declare that this enables us to carry out a conclusive exercise 
of refutation. And not because literature on growth theory has explored the 
possible existence of an inverse relation between income growth rate and initial 
income level, without taking into account capital formation15. The reality is that 
we are not in fact considering here the aggregate magnitude of capital formation 
but only a part of this, even though it is the “hard core” and is tightly linked to 
long term economic growth. Another weakness of my exercise lies in the fact 
that, in starting from 1890 this excludes the early stages of full insertion of Latin 
American economies in the world market, which deprives us of a very useful 
perspective for assessing appropriately what occurred in the quarter century 
prior to the World War. Lastly, and most importantly, the exercise which I am 
going to carry out puts to the test the existence of absolute convergence, that is 
to say, it presupposes that all the countries in the region participate from the 
same stationary state (Sala-i-Martín, 2000, pp. 200-1)16. Having admitted what 
I have just indicated, I understand that it remains of great interest to find out 
whether the distance separating investment levels of the less or more dynamic 
Latin American States increased or diminished. This represents a relevant 
contribution to the debate started by Williamson because, for the first time, all 
the Latin American republics are taken into account, while at the same time 
dealing with a relatively prolonged period.  
 
                                                 
14 Unfortunately, Williamson did not measure the dispersion of salaries further than 1914, which 
is why it is impossible to confirm the marked tendency to nearing between the most advanced 
and the straggler countries in GDP per capita. 
15  The absence of studies in this respect does not represent a major problem, since economic 
literature which predicts convergence among nations presupposes precisely decreasing returns 
of capital. 
16 Evidently, admitting that during the period Argentina and Haiti, to give an example, shared 
institutional, technological and preference parameters, is a gross simplification of reality.   In recent analyses about the economic growth theory a very simple 
formula of calculation is used, the beta convergence, based on the principle that 
what has to be verified is whether there is an inverse relation between the GDP 
growth rate or GDP per capita, and the initial level of this GDP. The beta 
convergence expresses in numerical form the compliance with or not of the 
principle that the lower the initial level of a country –in this case, of investment 
per inhabitant- the greater its long term growth rate will tend to be (Sala-i-
Martín, 2000, pp. 194-6). Here, I will use this procedure here as an initial 
approach to such an important question. 
 
  Graph 6 shows the result obtained with my figures spanning the whole 
period, and excluding Bolivia and Paraguay, whose presumably spurious values 
affect very markedly the curve of least square adjustment. It is evidently difficult 
for the cloud of points to position itself along a straight line. Consequently, the 
value of R2 is very low. Even if we accept that the existence of a relationship 
between the level of investment at the starting point and the long term growth 
rate of this, it has a weak inversely proportional character17. Observe that beta, 




  The exercise I have just carried out is not of a conclusive nature. Despite 
this, I suggest that possibly the inequalities in the pace of investment growth –
and income? - followed a gradual tendency towards convergence. Here we have 
a verification of enormous importance on this subject. However much the 
equation of graph 6 represents an empirical contribution which in itself neither 
refutes nor confirms any general interpretation about economic differentiation 
at the heart of the region, what it does do is to invite us to rethink the postulates 
which many economic historians of Latin America defend.  
 
  However, we need to ask ourselves: Would we obtain the same result if 
we broke down the period into two halves, distinguishing the pre-war and post-
war periods? When we have had the opportunity to check, World War I 
represented a powerful shock to the process of capital accumulation in the 
whole region. In most countries, there was an investment collapse of greater 
intensity than that experienced at any other juncture of the period studied. In a 
minority, ultra-specialised in the export of sugar, there was an investment 
upswing of extraordinary proportions. If we admit the possibility that the 
impact of the conflict was so great that it went beyond what occurred during the 
war itself and had medium term effects on the growth of capital formation, then 
we must divide the period analysed into two sub-periods, with the dividing line 
at 1913. Graph 7 and 8 show the values corresponding to the two sub-periods, 
and the resulting equation of beta convergence. 
 
<graph 7> 
                                                 
17 The equation yields the following result:  log y = -0.982 log 1890 + 5.508 R² = 0.08 
            (1.13)    (3.35)** 
where ** indicates significance to 1 percent. 
18 What is most problematic is that, from a statistical point of view, there is no reasonable 
certainty about the value of beta: the probability that the statistic is false is higher than 5 
percent.  
  Graph 7 will probably be of comfort to many analysts, given that the 
cloud of points forms a curve with a positive gradient. From this it emerges that 
before World War I the gap between the more or less capitalised Latin American 
economies tended to widen. Concretely, the divergence increased at a not 
insignificant rate of 2.1 percent annually between 1890 and 1913. This evidence 
is in keeping with the dominant vision in historiography on the impact that 
integration in the international economy had on economies that did not start off 
from the same conditions, given the varying fortune of countries in terms of the 
lottery of natural resources –using Díaz Alejandro’s famous expression-, in the 
lottery of geographical barriers, and given their greater or lesser success in 
developing an institutional and political system capable of taking advantage of 
growth opportunities afforded by economic globalisation in the late 20th 
century. With insertion in the international economy all the Latin American 
economies benefited, but the most advantaged economies would have gained 
more; consequently, they would have increased their capital stock more rapidly 
than the straggler economies. However, no matter how plausible such an 
interpretation may be, the evidence that I have just shown is not statistically 
conclusive19. 
 
  It is extremely interesting to note that, contrary to what is usually 
maintained by those who defend the divergence theory, it does not appear that 
the tendency continued permanently until the start of the Great Depression. The 
data I am dealing with do not support the idea that the economic globalisation 
and the primary-exporter model carry with them an inexorable tendency 
towards divergence at the heart of Latin America. Graph 8 is very revealing in 




  Between 1913 and 1930, there was apparently a tendency which was 
opposite to that of a quarter of a century before. Levels of capital formation per 
inhabitant tended to converge. The value of beta is similar to the preceding 
period, with the opposite sign. This is why, being also of similar length, we do 
not observe a definite tendency towards convergence or divergence when 
spanning the period 1890-1930 (see graph 6). It is also true that the last 
statistical exercise also yields poor results20, which means empirical 
investigation does not reach a sufficiently firm conclusion from a statistical 
point of view. 
 
  Probably, the elevated dispersion reflected in graph 8 originates, 
fundamentally, in the disruption caused by the War. Naturally, this reflects a 
very real fact, which certainly brought along with it profound changes in the 
growth patterns of the economies in the region. The economic environment of 
the post-war was less liberal than that of the pre-war, with markets less open to 
certain products. What is most important and widely recognised, is that the War 
brought about technical change and transformations in the international 
                                                 
19 The equation below the graph is:  log y = 2.146 log 1890   -0.004    R²= 0.14 
            (1.58)                (0.00) 
20 The corresponding equation is:  log y = -2.469 log 1913 + 12.752   R² = 0.05 
            (0.90)    (2.08)   economic structure and in the wealth of the nations, all of which caused a 
geographic reorientation of trade and financial flows. The new context must 
have affected resource allocation in such a way that the most fortunate in the 
period prior to the War, like Argentina and Uruguay, were not necessarily in the 
best position to maintain elevated rates of investment. In the same way as some 
of the backward countries, such as Colombia and Venezuela, they now enjoyed 
unexpected growth opportunities thanks to the growing demand for new 
primary products such as petroleum. 
 
  The question which I have just raised goes beyond the limits of the 
present study. At any rate, the upside of this is that it indicates the need to keep 
on the research agenda, the issue of the effects of internationalisation on the 
growth of the Latin American economies in the half century preceding the crisis 
of the 1930s. Without doubt, the differences in the levels of investment at the 
heart of Latin America were always very big, even abysmal (see table 3). But, 
when we ask ourselves not about the differentiation, but whether or not it 
deepened, we come up with a univocal answer. We need at our disposal a 
significantly greater number of observations of the volume of investment in the 
different countries –perhaps dealing with various types of capital goods- in 
order to be able to make more statistically robust inferences.  Although for now 
we cannot avoid uncertainty, if we attribute to these results some value as an 
index, we must agree that these are of a contradictory nature. The last three 
graphs do not allow a simplistic interpretation.  It can be deduced from them 
that there were neither winners nor losers, or, rather, it was not always the same 
countries who gained the most. Before 1914 those who gained the most 
generally came from the ranks of the richest countries. After this date, the 
empirical evidence presented in this paper suggests that, instead, what occurred 





  This article offers, in essence, a reconstruction of the magnitudes of 
investment in machinery in Latin America during the period between 1890 and 
1930. These four decades span the culminating phase of the first economic 
globalisation, a historical era in which, as is well know, the Latin American 
nations were intensely integrated into the international economy. Until now, 
economic historians have relied on limited empirical evidence on the pace of 
capitalisation of the economies of the region, this evidence being limited to a 
minority of countries –not even all the medium-sized economies- and not going 
back, in general terms, further than 1900. 
 
  Scholars of Latin American economic growth during the era of the first 
globalisation have been able to formulate consistent interpretations about the 
dynamic of such economies without relying on an adequate database of basic 
macro variables. This has been possible because the account given by 
historiography has been based on the supposition that the determining factor in 
the economic development of the Latin American countries during this period, 
as much in the long term as in the short, was the export sector –about which 
sufficient statistical evidence is available. It was on exports that capital 
formation itself depended (Cortés Conde and Hunt, 1985, p. 16), given that capital formation stemmed from imports of equipment goods which were 
financed either with foreign currency earned from exports, or with foreign 
capital. Economic historians have tended to think that this only occurred in 
times of export bonanza, meaning Latin American countries were, inevitably, 
subjected to permanent financial restriction on growth. The hypothesis is 
plausible, but it has not been sufficiently proved. And even if it were true in 
general terms, it may well not be in particular circumstances or in some cases of 
countries which managed to develop modern productive sectors aimed at 
satisfying home demand. 
 
  Only if there is access to positive, precise knowledge about how physical 
capital formation developed in general and the machinery endowment in 
particular, will it be possible to put to the test some of the basic conceptions 
defended by economic historians of Latin America. Examples of these are the 
generalised and extreme macroeconomic instability associated with the ups and 
downs in the export sector, or the supposed close correspondence between 
export cycles and investment cycles. This is what gives meaning and importance 
to a paper such as this one, which above all, contributes a quantification which 
is complete in its temporal and territorial coverage of the nucleus of productive 
investment. 
 
  In the first part of the article I present and analyse the behaviour of 
investment in machinery in the whole of Latin America. The long term tendency 
was clearly upward. Throughout the period 1890-1930 it increased to an average 
rate of 5.5 percent annually, causing capital equipment to increase at double the 
output. The image of dynamism of the investment in machinery in the whole of 
Latin America has been reinforced on comparing it with that of Europe and the 
United States. This contrast highlights the fact that Latin America’s 
capitalisation effort was clearly superior to that of the Old Continent and was on 
a par with the capitalisation effort of the United States, the leading economy. 
Another significant aspect of the Latin American grouping of countries is to be 
found in the existence of two phases where the process of accumulation came to 
a halt: the depression of the 1890s and the investment collapse caused by the 
World War. Both episodes brought with them the loss of a decade of growth. A 
third movement that warrants attention is that of the very strong expansion that 
characterised the early years of the 20th century. The Belle Époque proved to be 
a more favourable juncture than the famous 1920s.  
 
  The obvious instability of investment serves to confirm the interpretation 
of consensus among scholars of the economic past of the region. This 
quantitative elaboration reveals that the investment in machinery fluctuated far 
more than the output, with fluctuations being sharper in the period 1914-1930 
than in 1891-1913. This supports the classical historiographic view which has 
emphasised the great instability which the economies of the region suffered 
during the export era, especially in the final years. But, the results which are 
made known here are not easy to interpret because, apart from showing the lack 
of apparent correlation between the volatility of GDP growth and of investment, 
they also show that the relatively greater or smaller level of this volatility did not 
depend on the degree of economic development. The data suggest that, 
irrespective of what this was, the high investment volatility was related with 
belonging to the Central American or Caribbean area, which could be because the countries situated in this area were monoexporter economies of coffee and 
sugar.  
 
  One element which absolutely cannot be ignored in any analysis of the 
economic reality of the region is the existing diversity at the heart of the region. 
The statistical reconstruction which has been undertaken highlights the fact that 
within the regional grouping, there are great underlying national differences.  It 
is simply incorrect to refer to the process of capitalisation of Latin America 
without distinguishing among the countries. Although there are some patterns 
common to all of them, these are outweighed by the differences. The first and 
most spectacular of these differences lies in the magnitudes of capital formation 
in the different republics. Argentina and Brazil were in a dominant position, 
accumulating almost half of the investment in the region. And almost all 
investment is accounted for when Mexico, Cuba and Chile are added to these 
first two countries, since the five together accounted for 5/6 of total capital. 
However, in view of the disparate territorial and demographic size of the States 
that make up the Latin American community, the most outstanding 
differentiating feature is not so much what I have just explained in terms of 
observable inequalities in levels of investment in machinery per capita. There is 
an abysmal gap separating the head group –formed by Cuba and Argentina, and 
at a considerable distance, Chile and Uruguay- from the straggler group –Haiti, 
Paraguay and Bolivia, and one rung above them Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Colombia, Guatemala and Honduras. The distance between the Latin American 
countries with greater or lesser volume of investment per inhabitant in capital 
equipment was, probably, far superior to that found within Europe and other 
areas of the Western world. 
 
  National differentiation did not only concern the absolute and relative 
magnitudes of capital formation, but also its cyclical pattern. The statistical 
analysis of the results shows that there are no traces that throughout the first 
globalisation Latin American countries tended towards a greater 
synchronisation of their investment cycles. During the period studied there were 
various episodes of one or the other sign –greater or lesser cyclical 
synchronisation- which seem to suggest that the economies of the region were 
unequally affected by the changes produced in the international economy. It is 
noteworthy that the World War meant an exceptionally serious supply shock 
which had a very unequal impact, more so than any other phenomenon. 
 
  Finally, the national series generated have made it possible to put to the 
test the thesis of divergence among the economies in the region, which enjoys 
great prestige among many specialists. Effectively, most authors defend the idea 
that the first globalisation widened the gap between the wealthiest and poorest 
nations in the region. By carrying out a very simple econometric exercise, which 
assumes the possibility of absolute convergence, we come up with some results 
of great interest. Spanning the entire period 1890-1930, the most backward 
nations in investment per inhabitant would have tended to converge with the 
most advanced ones, at a rate of close to 1 percent annually. However, if we 
distinguish between the period preceding the World War and that after the start 
of hostilities, we discover that in the former, Latin American countries diverged, 
at an annual rate superior to 2 percent.  Between 1914 and 1939 the opposite 
occurred, and they converged at a rate of 2.5 percent. This evidence challenges up to a point the vision established by historiography. Unfortunately, the 
exercise is not statistically conclusive. What must continue to feature on the 
research agenda is the fundamental question of whether or not the existing 
differences among the Latin American economies deepened as a result of their 















  The quantitative elaboration which I present in this paper is based on the 
massive and systematic use of foreign trade statistics (FTS from now on) of the 
three countries which supplied by far the largest part of the machinery with 
which all the Latin American countries were equipped; namely Germany, the 
United States and the United Kingdom (G-3 from now on). This assertion is not 
based on a simple presumption or on general, known data on the value of the 
goods purchased from the G-3 out of the total imported by Latin American 
countries21. One concludes that the G-3 had, a stable and overwhelming 
predominance as supplier of the region, judging by the relative importance of 
imports of machinery manufactured in these three countries out of the total 
machinery imported by the Latin American nations. The results that I have 
obtained from an elaboration based on the Latin American FTS for the years 
1913 and 1925 speak for themselves: 
 
Relative weight of machinery exported by the most industrialised nations within imports of 
machinery from Latin America (in percentage) 
  United States  U. Kingdom  Germany  G-3 
  1913  1925  1913  1925  1913  1925  1913  1925 
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57.4 
   
14.2 
   
16.9 
   
88.5 
 
  The use of the FTS of the G-3 as a source of evaluation of Latin American 
imports has three great advantages. One is that it simplifies enormously the task 
of selection and processing of the data, since it reduces to a minimum the 
heterogeneity of the information sources. This is the natural result of dealing 
with a small number of different statistical publications, instead of 20 –one for 
each Latin American state. The second, and not less important, virtue lies in the 
fact that the FTS of the industrialised countries inform us about the exports in 
the whole region, or a little less (see below). It is thus easy to reach a degree of 
maximum territorial coverage, which would otherwise be impossible to achieve. 
In addition, there is a third advantage in terms of Latin American FTS, namely 
the maximum time coverage. The FTS of the G-3 supply the minimum 
indispensable information for the whole period being studied, unlike Latin 
American FTS. 
 
  Without doubt, the foreign trade statistics of the G-3 are not without 
limitations which complicate the calculation of the magnitudes of machinery 
imports, or any other type of capital goods, on the part of Latin America. In the 
following paragraphs I will refer to these deficiencies, while at the same time 
describing the method I have used to carry out the estimation, without going 
into too much detail in order not to draw out the explanation excessively. For 
                                                 
21 See, for example, the mass of data contained in the Pan American Union (1952). greater clarity, the criticism of the sources and the methodological description 
deal with each of the members of the G-3 separately22. 
 
Germany 
The German FTS present the following problems: 
 
1) There were no annual statistics published between 1914 and 191923. 
2) The statistics from the years 1920, 1921 and 1922 record only the 
quantities exported, always expressed in 100 kilograms, and, 
additionally, in quite a few epigraphs, in units.  
3) The territory which the FTS of Germany refer to is not the same before 
and after the World War, since owing to the war Germany lost some 
regions (Luxemburg, Alsace-Lorena, Sarre, Northern Schleswig, Dantzig, 
Western Poland and High Silesia, as well as others of little significance). 
4) The German FTS, like that of the USA, and in contrast to that of Britain, 
give information about the exports to all countries of every type of 
product registered in the customs tariffs (see the particular exceptions in 
7). However, the German FTS does not record those with a value of less 
than 5.000 marks24. 
5)  The values are in thousands of marks, which lead to mistakes being made 
due to imprecision in certain calculations, such as small aggregates and 
unitary values of specific products. 
6)  The structure of the statistics remains stable throughout the period, 
except for March 1906, when, as a result of the new tariff law, the number 
of epigraphs multiplied, which in practice made it impossible to match up 
the prior classification with classification subsequent to that date25. 
7)  Exports to Costa Rica, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic did not 
appear individually until 1897; the same applies to exports to El Salvador, 
Honduras and Nicaragua until 1906 (before they were grouped together 
in an entity called Central America). Cuba and Puerto Rico are 
distinguished between in terms of statistics only from 1896.  
 
Some of the disadvantages which I have just pointed out are 
insurmountable and must simply be accepted, such as for example the 
territorial change or the dearth of information of the war period26. Other 
limitations, which appear to represent a serious impediment to a truthful 
calculation of equipment exported, as in 4), are in fact of little importance: the 
threshold in question, namely exports below the value of 5.000 marks, is low in 
relation to the unitary value of equipment goods, which is why they are almost 
in entirety registered in the German FTS.  
                                                 
22 In Allen & Ely (1953) the characteristics of the statistics of the most industrialised countries 
are reviewed in detail, and also, in a more superficial manner, the Latin American countries. It 
is, likewise, extremely useful to consult the monographs on foreign trade published by the 
Society of Nations in the 1920s, such as, for example, Société des Nations (1928). 
23 The data for trade from January to June 1914 were published in the monthly statistics, which I 
have not been able to find for these months. Furthermore, the statistics for 1921 refer to the 
period from 1 May to 31 December. 
24 Operations of smaller amounts are totalled in the last epigraph of miscellaneous. 
25 Until 1905 the number of epigraphs for machinery amounted to 36. The tariff structure 
instituted in 1906 –in force in 1930- broadened the number of product categories to 145. 
26 All the evidence I know indicates that German sales of equipment goods to Latin America 
dropped to virtually zero during the war.  
  Seemingly, the greatest difficulty we face is related to point 6). There is 
no manner of avoiding the break in the series in 1906. However, in view of the 
results obtained from the simple calculation of values registered in the customs 
tariffs from 1905 to 1906, there is no significant bias27. 
 
  This is why with regards the lack of information for 1914-1922, I have 
opted for the following: 1) to extrapolate the magnitudes of 1913 and the period 
May-December 1921 to the first semester of 1914 and to the first four months of 
1921, respectively28; 2) to estimate the quantities exported in 1920-22. I have 
not assigned any monetary value, in terms of current prices, to the aggregate of 
the quantities. I have dealt with it as an index of volume which allows an 
automatic conversion into values when one moves to operate in constant marks. 
Naturally, behind this simple arithmetical transformation there lie two strong 
suppositions, namely: that the relative prices remained constant and that the 
composition of the equipment goods exported remained unaltered. The second 
supposition is perhaps realistic given that we are dealing with such a brief 
period, but the first is most probably not, due to the hyperinflation experienced 
throughout these three years (and which is precisely the reason why the FTS do 
not give information about the product values). The objection is clear. 
Nonetheless, I have not reviewed the valuation criterion because I do not feel it 
is feasible to use an alternative procedure. 
 
  Finally, there are statistical gaps to fill in terms of some countries in the 
initial years (see 7). After considering different possibilities, I have tended 
towards evaluating these data as a derivation of the statistical registers of 
American exports. When I refer to the treatment of United States’ FTS, I will 
return to this issue. 
 
 
The United States 
The North American FTS constitute a source of extraordinary quality, clearly 
greater than German statistics and more still than the British. One of the most 
appreciable virtues of the United States FTS is that they give information about 
United States trade with all sovereign states and American colonial territories, 
however small the amount29. Another noteworthy virtue lies in the classification 
of goods, which uses coherent, rational criteria from the point of view of 
                                                 
27 The rate of interannual variation in 1906 (calculated with the new customs tariff structure) 
maintains a relation with the variation registered for British and American equipment goods 
exports. The doubt arises as to whether the 1906 classification in fact encouraged the 
appearance of a group of new goods such as electric equipment, which until then had formed 
part of categories that classified equipment goods generically. 
28 Specifically, I have supposed that between January and the end of July 1914 Germany 
exported half of what they did the previous year. This seems a sensible supposition, in view of 
how European sales to Latin America evolved. Neither do I have evidence to dissuade me from 
generalising export activity from May to December 1921, to the whole of that year, and 
consequently, I have multiplied the figures for these months by the coefficient 1.5. 
29 The United States trade statistics provide complete data of its foreign trade with: Bermudas, 
Barbados, British Honduras (Belize), Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, British Guyana, French 
Guyana, Dutch Guyana, the remaining British possessions in America, the Virgin Islands and 
other Danish possessions in America, the remaining Dutch possessions and the French 
possessions. economic analysis, and which gives a break-down of equipment goods which is 
extremely useful for the researcher. Nevertheless, they cannot be considered a 
perfect source for the goals we are pursuing here. Below we indicate those 
characteristics which lead to methodological problems: 
   
1)  Until 1917 the natural year is not used, but rather the financial year which 
ends on 30 June (and, logically, begins on 1 July of the previous year). 
2)  There are no data of quantities for a considerable portion of the types of 
products registered in the customs tariffs. The information is 
heterogeneous for the rest (units, different measurements of weight, 
capacity, etc.). Consequently, it was only possible to obtain aggregate 
magnitudes in value (expressed in dollars). 
 
The second limitation implies that the quantification of equipment goods 
exported by the G-3 can only be done in monetary values. Quantity indexes or 
any type of volume series is ruled out precisely because they lack the 
information necessary in the case of American exports. Given the importance of 
these in the total exported by the G-3 to Latin America, the limitation is indeed 
insurmountable. The same applies to the limitation I mentioned in the first 
place, but it is far less significant. Given the non-existence of monthly statistics, 
the adjustment of the export figures from fiscal years to natural years can only 
be done in one way: taking the average of consecutive pairs of financial years 
and assigning the resulting value to the first natural year used in the calculation. 
The information available does not allow another solution, but in spite of this 
we should not ignore the fact that this is an estimation which is subject to 
margins of error, though admittedly these are tolerable. The method of 
calculation assumes that every year the export activity evolved at the same rate 
for both semesters, which would only be true had there been no seasonal 
variation or economic cycles. Since in reality it is not like this, it cannot be 
expected that the magnitudes derived from the American statistics for the 
period prior to 1918, once adjusted to calendar years, express with precision the 
annual amount of its foreign trade. 
 
The calculation of goods exported by the United States to Latin American 
nations holds no mystery, which is why I need make no comments on this. It is 
worth adding that North American statistics have to provide us with yet another 
service: that of completing the estimation of machinery exported by Germany 
and the United Kingdom. As I indicate in the respective sections, in the 
calculation of both countries there were some loose ends, in reference to the 
sales to some small countries in certain years. I left these loose ends in the 
German and British export series unresolved because it was easier and safer to 
deal with them based on American exports. As a general criterion, I have made 
use of North American exports, and occasionally those of one of the other two 
exporters, as the base for extrapolation, as long as they represented a large part 
of the total exports of the G-3 in the years close to those for which I have all the 
information. If the data for estimation refer to very few years and there is a clear 
tendency apparent in the following years, I have been inclined towards back-
extrapolate the tendency. 
 
 The United Kingdom 
The British statistics pose many more problems than the German or American 
FTS when one is attempting to find out the quantity of machinery exports to 
Latin American nations. The main disadvantages are the following: 
 
1)  In terms of machinery exported to most countries in the region, statistics 
only offer the total figure (in one epigraph first titled ‘Machinery and Mill 
work, and parts thereof’, later simply ‘Machinery’). All that is registered 
are  the figures of exports of the different types of products registered in 
the customs tariffs included in the aggregate of machinery destined for 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and, generally, Mexico and Uruguay.  
 
2)  British statistics do not offer data about exports to the smallest Latin 
American countries of certain equipment goods closely related with 
machinery, such as electrical material separate from electrical machinery 
–the group ‘Electrical goods and apparatus other than Electrical 
Machinery’- and similar tools and utensils –the group ‘Implements and 
Tools’. 
 
3)  Sales to some small countries did not appear as individual cases in the 
initial years. Specifically, until 1891 Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras and Nicaragua are grouped under the same name ‘Central 
America’. The same occurs with Cuba and Puerto Rico while they are 
Spanish colonies. The statistics do not distinguish between Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic either until 1912. Finally, exports to Bolivia are not 
registered until 1909. 
 
4)  The classification of capital goods into the different categories shown in 
the statistics and the breakdown of these does not remain unchangeable 
throughout this period. The most important changes took place in 1909 
and 1920. 
 
5)  The FTS give information about the value of export goods (in pounds 
sterling), but on many occasions do not inform us of the quantities 
exported. This happens in the case of the groups of electrical equipment 
and tools, and also that of machinery prior to 1904. From this date 
onwards, the total in metric tons is registered. 
 
One of the greatest headaches for the researcher lies in 4), or rather the 
combination of 4) with 1) and 2). In the early years, the breakdown of 
machinery is extremely limited. Despite the fact that Great Britain was the 
factory of the world, it appears that the authorities in charge of trade statistics 
attributed scant importance to the publishing of export data of the different 
types of machinery. Furthermore, until 1919 locomotives were included in the 
machinery group. The fact that in the first two decades information was so 
scarce, implies that it is difficult to be sure that we are working with a 
homogenous group of goods. 
 
The quantification of sales of British machinery to Latin America demands, 
therefore, that in the first place we subtract the value of (steam) locomotives for the period prior to 192030. In the cases in which the FTS of the United Kingdom 
does not give export figures, I have calculated them as a linear function of the 
size of the railway network of the country in question, and then made some 
reasonable suppositions in order to make the calculation work31. Unfortunately, 
I have had to estimate other products in order to reach a final figure for 
machinery and related equipment goods exported by the United Kingdom. 
Going by the criteria of national accounts established by the United Nations, the 
desired aggregate consists of the sum of three categories of goods from the FTS: 
machinery (excluding locomotives), implements and tools, and electrical goods 
and apparatus (other than machinery and telegraph and telephone wire). The 
statistics always give the data concerning the first category, except in the case 
that this does not contain data for any product exported to a any country in 
specific (small, and in the earliest years, see 1). With regards the group of tools, 
the statistics are incomplete. We do not know anything concerning Bolivia, 
Panama and the Dominican Republic, and almost nothing about Honduras and 
Paraguay. For some of the remaining countries there are some gaps: Costa Rica, 
1910-1914; Cuba, 1890-1894; Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela, 1926-1930. I have 
filled in the abovementioned gaps by evaluating the value of the tools by means 
of the application of the value of exported machinery of the average percentage 
of tools over machinery. The procedure used is reasonably solid because it 
extrapolates to the unknown cases, the average national percentages, which in 
virtually all cases cover fifteen countries, and because it is definitely sensible to 
fix the value of tools exported (imported) in agreement with the value of 
machinery exported (imported) for each country. 
 
  Finally, it remains to determine the magnitudes of electric goods 
exported by the United Kingdom. Here, the quantification is not as firmly 
founded. British FTS only register systematically, this type of product 
dispatched to seven countries: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia (from 1915), Chile, 
Mexico, Peru and Uruguay (the latter three, from 1895). There is little doubt 
that all together they gathered together the immense majority of electrical 
equipment bought by Latin America from Great Britain. But, it must be 
remembered that, unlike the majority of historic-economic studies on the 
region, my research does not back itself up with this line of argument, but with 
another which defends the supreme importance of constructing series on 
investment for each and every country in the area. With this principle 
reaffirmed, the question emerges: how can we assess the value of British 
electrical material compared to the other thirteen nations? In my 
understanding, the best alternative we have is to apply the average percentage 
                                                 
30 This is not insignificant: in the period 1890-1919 the value of locomotive exports to the whole 
world represented nearly 10 percent of the value of machinery exported by the United Kingdom 
(excluding locomotives). In the case of Latin America the percentage was much higher, to be 
precise 24 percent, for those countries for which trade statistics provide the data. 
31 The first step in the calculation was to calculate the percentage which the railway network 
represents, annually for each country for which we do not know British exports of locomotives, 
of the sum of the networks in all these countries. The source of these data is Mitchell (2003), 
complemented by Sanz (1998). The abovementioned percentage applies to the figure of British 
locomotive exports to this grouping of countries. Naturally, I have had to estimate the figure in 
question. For lack of anything better, I have derived it from the proportion represented by the 
total value of machinery exports to these countries proportional to the value of total British 
machinery exports. The quotient is applied to the value of total exports of locomotives, assuming 
that they resemble the aforesaid. represented by this group of goods in relation to the groups of machinery and 
tools in the seven countries about which we have complete information. I have 
tended to use as coefficient the simple arithmetic average instead of the 
weighted one since the latter is excessively dominated by the strong prevailing 
weight of Argentina and Brazil. But, we should not simply dismiss the 
explanation of this step of the quantitative elaboration. Before doing so, it is 
necessary to consider if the margins of error are tolerable, or, at least to form an 
opinion about the extent of these margins. The goods grouped into the category 
electrical goods represent, in value, 15.1 percent of the machinery and tools 
exported between 1890 and 1930 by the United Kingdom to the seven 
abovementioned nations32. However, the relative importance of these goods 
changed noticeably after the World War: in the pre-war period they were 
situated at slightly below 10 percent, while in 1919-1930 they rose to nearly 25 
percent. Consequently, my estimation is more risky in this final period. Another 
element to consider is the degree of statistical dispersion of the national 
percentages. If it were very elevated, obviously the estimation would be quite 
risky. Fortunately, this is not the case, especially for the period prior to 1914. 
During this period, the coefficient of variation of the percentages was, on 
average, 6.3 percent; only in three years did it surpass the threshold of 10 
percent. The statistical markers corresponding to 1914-1930 do not yield such 
comforting results: the average coefficient of variation is 20.8 percent. It is true 
that the great disparities were concentrated in the war period, except for two 
particular years (1922 and 1926). I strongly believe that we can be reasonably 
sure that handling the abovementioned annual average percentage we are not 
deviating significantly from the percentage that the group of electrical goods 
really should have represented for the countries that we do not have 
information about in this regard. 
 
All that remains to point out is that the gaps in the series of some small 
countries mentioned in 2) have been filled based on series from Germany and 
very particularly, from the United States, as I have explained previously. 
 
 
Elaboration of aggregate series 
 
As I have indicated, the quantification of transport equipment exported by the 
most industrialised countries can only be done in monetary values. The 
quantum indexes or any type of series of volume are excluded because they lack 
the information necessary in the case of the United States and, in part, Great 
Britain. Along with the handling of monetary values comes the need to use 
exchange rates between the currencies of the G-3 so as to assign to the different 
groups of goods, values in the same currency, and also, thereafter, the use of a 
price index to transform these into stable values.   
 
  Once completed the calculation of machinery exported by Germany, the 
United States and the United Kingdom, I have converted the series of the first 
two into pounds sterling. This conversion does not pose the slightest problem33. 
                                                 
32 The proportion is practically the same in exports to the whole world: 14.2 percent. 
33 I have used the series of exchange rates contributed by specialists, gathered in Carter (2006, 
vol. 5, pp. 565-7) following the recommendations of his compiler Lawrence H. Officer, when 
various possibilities existed. The assessment of German exports could have turned out to be The subsequent addition offers us the export series of the G-3 expressed in 
current pounds. All that still remains is the step of deflating the series to obtain 
the aggregates of the exports in real terms. As a deflator I have used the price 
indexes of equipment goods drawn up by Charles Feinstein (1972) (1988)34. 
With this we obtain series that are sufficiently consistent, in pounds of 1913, of 
the exports of the G-3 to Latin America. Taking the precaution of converting 
these series of real values into index numbers, I believe that we get a clear image 





































                                                                                                                                               
extremely complicated in the hyperinflationary interval of 1920-3, but the absence of a nominal 
valuation in the German FTS highlighted the problem and obliged me to construct a chain index 
based on the quantities.  
34 The index used for the period 1860-1920 (Feinstein, 1988, pp. 470-1) has been spliced in 1920 
with the index previously constructed by this author (Feinstein, 1972, pp. T136-7), after having 
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Table  1.  Volatility  of  investment  growth  and  GDP  growth1  (in  rates  of 
annual variation) 
 
  1891-19132  1914-19303  1890-1930 
Argentina  26    (8,o)          25    (9,5)  25 
Bolivia  117  29  82 
Brazil  23    (5,2)  31     (4,8)  26 
Colombia  19  34  26 
Costa Rica4  14  37     (8,3)  24 
Cuba5  37  (23,4)  35   (17,6)  36 
Chile  23    (3,0)  29  (12,4)  26 
Ecuador  14  21  17 
El Salvador4  23  39    (9,9)  30 
Guatemala4  24  34     (6,1)  28 
Haiti  28  73  45 
Honduras4  21  42    (8,4)  30 
Mexico6  13     (5,7)  27     (4,1)  19 
Nicaragua4  29  39   (11,6)  33 
Panama    29  37 
Paraguay  130  169  146 
Peru  20  26    (3,8)  22 
Dominican Rep.  22  41  30 
Uruguay  28  24  26 
Venezuela  19    (6,2)  34   (11,6)  26 
Latin America  11  22  15 
1In parenthesis. 
21900-13 in the case of the volatility of GDP growth, unless otherwise indicated. 
31913-29 in the case of volatility of GDP growth, unless otherwise indicated. 
4The GDP data of the second period cover the years 1920-9. 
5The GDP data of the first period cover the years 1903-13. 




Table 2. Capital formation in machinery and equipment of the various countries as a percentage of the Latin 




























































































































































































1890  21,9  0,0  23,7  2,9  0,8  12,1  8,4  0,4  0,7  1,3  0,3  0,4  15,3  0,7    0,1  2,8  1,1  4,7  2,5  100 
1891  7,7  0,0  40,1  2,6  0,8  14,4  5,2  0,5  0,7  1,4  0,2  0,3  16,0  0,6    0,0  3,3  1,2  2,6  2,4  100 
1892  17,7  0,1  26,5  2,2  0,7  19,9  8,0  0,5  0,8  1,5  0,3  0,2  14,0  1,2    0,0  1,8  1,2  1,5  1,9  100 
1893  24,4  0,0  25,8  2,0  0,5  16,2  8,9  0,5  0,5  1,7  0,3  0,2  12,2  0,3    0,0  1,6  1,3  1,8  1,9  100 
1894  24,7  0,1  25,7  2,0  0,5  12,6  7,3  0,6  0,6  2,1  0,3  0,2  14,8  0,4    0,0  1,4  1,6  2,8  2,3  100 
1895  17,3  0,0  32,1  2,1  0,6  6,6  9,3  0,5  0,9  2,5  0,2  0,2  18,7  0,8    0,0  1,9  1,3  2,4  2,5  100 
1896  16,8  0,0  29,5  3,2  0,8  2,9  7,7  0,7  1,3  3,9  0,4  0,2  22,3  0,7    0,0  3,2  1,2  2,9  2,2  100 
1897  19,8  0,1  23,5  3,8  0,9  1,7  6,9  0,8  1,1  3,0  0,3  0,3  29,1  0,7    0,0  3,1  0,9  1,8  2,3  100 
1898  25,1  0,1  18,2  3,0  0,9  2,4  4,9  0,9  0,5  1,1  0,1  0,2  34,2  0,4    0,0  3,0  0,8  2,3  1,6  100 
1899  25,4  0,2  16,3  1,3  0,8  5,5  5,4  0,8  0,3  0,5  0,1  0,2  35,9  0,4    0,2  2,5  0,8  2,4  1,0  100 
1900  21,8  0,2  20,3  0,7  0,9  6,5  6,1  0,8  0,4  0,5  0,2  0,2  33,8  0,5    0,1  3,5  0,8  2,0  0,8  100 
1901  24,9  0,4  12,9  1,0  0,7  8,6  7,4  0,9  0,5  0,7  0,2  0,3  33,3  0,4    0,1  4,0  0,7  2,0  1,1  100 
1902  25,0  0,2  15,5  1,0  0,6  7,7  7,8  0,7  0,4  0,6  0,2  0,2  32,7  0,4    0,1  3,6  0,4  2,3  0,6  100 
1903  31,6  0,3  14,1  1,7  0,6  6,4  8,6  0,7  0,4  0,3  0,2  0,2  27,8  0,4    0,1  3,9  0,3  1,8  0,8  100 
1904  33,5  0,5  14,1  1,5  0,5  8,8  8,0  0,6  0,5  0,5  0,2  0,2  23,1  0,4  0,6  0,2  3,8  0,3  1,5  1,1  100 
1905  33,9  0,4  12,8  1,2  0,3  10,7  11,3  0,5  0,4  0,5  0,1  0,1  19,7  0,3  1,5  0,1  2,9  0,4  1,9  0,8  100 
1906  35,1  0,2  14,2  0,8  0,4  8,0  10,3  0,4  0,3  0,4  0,1  0,1  20,9  0,2  1,9  0,3  2,6  0,3  2,6  0,7  100 
1907  28,7  0,5  18,9  1,0  0,5  6,9  11,0  0,5  0,4  0,4  0,1  0,1  20,7  0,2  2,4  0,2  2,7  0,4  3,7  0,7  100 
1908  33,7  0,5  19,2  1,3  0,5  6,0  9,2  0,5  0,4  0,4  0,2  0,2  18,3  0,2  3,3  0,1  2,2  0,4  2,8  0,8  100 
1909  36,6  0,4  19,7  1,3  0,5  7,0  6,8  0,5  0,4  0,5  0,2  0,2  16,5  0,2  3,0  0,1  1,9  0,5  2,9  0,8  100 
1910  35,3  0,4  21,2  1,3  0,4  8,3  7,0  0,4  0,4  0,4  0,2  0,2  15,6  0,2  1,8  0,1  2,0  0,6  3,3  0,8  100 
1911  32,4  0,4  24,0  1,4  0,4  8,4  8,7  0,5  0,5  0,4  0,2  0,2  13,9  0,3  1,2  0,1  2,0  0,7  3,3  1,0  100 
1912  31,2  0,6  25,8  1,7  0,5  7,8  8,9  0,4  0,4  0,5  0,2  0,2  12,0  0,3  1,7  0,2  2,1  0,9  3,4  1,2  100 
1913  30,0  1,0  25,9  2,0  0,5  7,6  9,2  0,5  0,5  0,6  0,1  0,3  10,9  0,3  2,3  0,2  2,8  0,8  2,7  1,5  100 
1914  30,3  0,9  21,7  3,2  0,6  10,2  9,4  0,8  0,5  0,7  0,1  0,6  8,7  0,4  3,0  0,1  3,7  0,8  2,5  1,8  100 
1915  25,5  0,6  12,6  4,0  0,6  25,2  6,1  0,8  0,7  0,5  0,2  0,8  7,8  0,6  4,2  0,0  3,5  1,4  2,4  2,5  100 
1916  18,2  0,5  13,1  2,6  0,5  33,0  8,8  0,6  0,5  0,5  0,2  0,5  8,1  0,7  3,0  0,0  4,0  1,5  1,8  2,0  100 
1917  13,2  0,6  14,2  2,4  0,2  33,9  9,1  0,7  0,4  0,4  1,1  0,4  10,2  0,6  2,4  0,3  3,9  2,3  1,9  1,6  100 
1918  16,4  1,1  12,4  1,6  0,2  25,3  13,6  0,6  0,2  0,3  0,8  0,3  13,5  0,4  2,8  0,3  5,2  2,4  1,5  1,1  100 
1919  18,0  1,0  18,3  2,1  0,3  22,1  9,3  0,8  0,4  0,5  0,2  0,4  14,5  0,4  1,4  0,1  5,2  1,3  2,5  1,3  100 
1920  18,4  0,5  17,6  3,4  0,4  25,4  5,6  0,6  0,4  0,5  0,2  0,7  14,5  0,5  1,0  0,3  4,9  1,8  1,7  1,6  100 
1921  21,7  0,9  14,8  2,9  0,4  17,3  6,3  0,4  0,5  0,7  0,2  0,9  21,0  0,5  1,3  0,1  4,7  2,4  1,6  1,6  100 
1922  27,4  0,8  19,7  3,5  0,4  9,5  7,9  1,0  0,4  0,8  0,2  0,7  17,6  0,2  0,6  0,1  3,3  1,2  2,4  2,3  100 
1923  32,0  1,0  15,0  3,5  0,4  12,6  7,9  0,8  0,4  0,9  0,4  0,7  13,8  0,3  0,7  0,1  4,1  1,0  2,3  2,2  100 
1924  29,1  0,9  17,9  3,4  0,4  13,4  7,6  0,7  0,7  1,0  0,2  0,4  13,0  0,4  0,8  0,1  3,9  1,2  2,0  2,7  100 
1925  28,8  0,8  19,7  4,0  0,4  10,9  7,5  0,5  0,6  0,9  0,3  0,3  13,0  0,4  0,8  0,1  3,8  0,8  2,5  3,8  100 
1926  30,7  0,8  15,7  5,3  0,3  6,3  11,4  0,5  0,7  0,9  0,2  0,3  12,6  0,2  0,7  0,1  3,7  0,6  2,2  6,6  100 
1927  32,3  0,8  15,7  6,2  0,4  8,1  7,4  0,5  0,6  1,0  0,3  0,3  11,8  0,3  0,9  0,1  3,6  0,9  2,6  6,3  100 
1928  36,9  0,8  16,9  5,9  0,5  5,4  6,0  0,6  0,6  0,9  0,3  0,4  12,0  0,4  1,1  0,1  2,7  0,7  2,7  5,0  100 
1929  37,3  0,8  17,2  4,8  0,5  4,8  8,1  0,5  0,5  0,8  0,2  0,4  11,1  0,3  1,0  0,1  2,7  0,5  2,8  5,6  100 
1930  35,7  0,8  12,3  2,8  0,3  4,1  11,6  0,5  0,4  0,4  0,2  0,5  15,3  0,3  1,8  0,1  2,4  0,4  4,8  5,3  100 
  
 
Table 3. Capital formation in machinery and equipment per capita of the various Latin American countries, 





























































































































































































1890  37  0  9  5  19  42  18  2  6  6  1  6  7  11  1  6  13  38  6  11 
1891  14  0  17  5  20  56  12  3  7  7  1  6  8  10  0  8  15  22  6  12 
1892  31  0  11  4  17  76  19  2  7  7  1  4  7  18  0  4  15  12  5  12 
1893  44  0  11  4  12  67  22  3  5  8  2  3  7  4  0  4  17  15  5  13 
1894  40  0  10  3  12  49  17  3  5  10  2  3  7  6  0  3  20  22  6  11 
1895  29  0  13  4  14  27  22  2  8  14  1  3  10  14  0  4  16  19  7  12 
1896  24  0  10  5  17  11  16  3  10  20  2  3  10  10  0  6  13  21  5  11 
1897  25  0  7  5  16  6  13  3  7  14  1  4  12  8  0  6  8  11  5  9 
1898  33  0  6  5  17  9  10  4  4  6  1  3  15  6  0  6  8  15  4  10 
1899  42  1  7  3  19  25  14  5  3  4  1  3  19  7  3  6  10  19  3  12 
1900  39  1  9  1  23  33  17  5  4  4  1  4  20  10  1  9  10  18  3  14 
1901  36  1  5  2  16  34  17  5  4  5  1  5  16  6  1  9  8  15  3  11 
1902  37  1  6  2  14  31  18  4  3  5  1  3  17  7  2  8  4  17  2  12 
1903  57  1  6  4  17  30  25  4  4  3  1  4  17  8  1  10  4  16  3  14 
1904  75  3  8  4  18  53  29  5  6  5  2  5  18  9  5  13  6  17  5  18 
1905  100  3  10  4  16  85  55  6  7  7  1  4  21  10  2  13  9  29  5  24 
1906  122  2  13  4  23  76  61  6  7  7  1  4  27  9  10  14  10  46  5  28 
1907  101  6  18  5  27  68  68  7  8  7  1  4  28  9  6  15  11  68  6  29 
1908  102  5  16  5  23  52  52  6  7  6  2  6  22  8  4  10  9  46  5  26 
1909  107  4  17  5  28  60  38  6  7  8  2  6  20  8  2  9  13  47  6  26 
1910  121  5  22  6  28  85  48  6  10  7  2  6  23  10  5  12  17  64  7  31 
1911  113  5  26  7  29  88  63  8  11  9  3  8  22  14  4  12  22  66  9  33 
1912  112  8  29  9  34  87  68  8  11  11  2  9  21  14  7  13  31  71  11  35 
1913  100  13  28  10  36  81  68  8  12  13  2  13  19  13  9  17  26  55  15  33 
1914  57  6  13  9  24  61  40  8  8  8  1  16  9  10  2  13  16  29  10  19 
1915  28  3  4  6  14  85  15  5  5  4  1  12  5  9  0  7  15  16  8  11 
1916  25  3  6  5  13  139  27  4  5  5  1  9  6  14  0  10  21  15  8  14 
1917  19  4  7  5  7  149  30  6  5  4  7  8  8  12  5  10  34  17  7  15 
1918  22  6  5  3  6  101  42  5  2  3  4  5  10  7  5  13  31  13  5  14 
1919  30  6  10  5  9  109  35  8  5  6  2  8  14  10  2  16  21  26  7  17 
1920  54  6  17  15  23  219  38  10  9  10  3  24  26  20  11  26  54  31  15  31 
1921  76  13  17  15  31  180  52  9  12  17  2  40  47  23  2  31  83  35  17  37 
1922  66  8  16  13  20  67  46  13  8  13  2  20  27  7  2  15  29  37  18  26 
1923  94  13  15  15  25  109  57  14  9  17  5  26  26  13  2  23  30  43  22  32 
1924  100  13  21  18  34  138  65  14  20  23  3  18  30  21  4  26  42  44  32  38 
1925  110  14  26  24  33  127  73  12  20  23  5  15  34  25  6  29  30  64  51  43 
1926  117  15  21  31  28  73  113  11  22  25  4  13  33  15  4  29  24  56  91  43 
1927  118  13  20  35  34  91  71  11  17  24  5  15  30  16  4  26  30  64  84  41 
1928  141  15  23  35  47  66  61  14  17  23  6  18  32  23  6  21  27  69  71  44 
1929  161  18  26  33  54  67  94  14  16  22  5  21  34  21  8  24  19  84  91  50 
1930  126  14  15  16  23  47  111  11  10  10  4  22  39  18  5  18  12  117  71  41 
  
 





























































































































































































1890  16  0  20  31  32  35  20  20  32  49  42  26  31  55    6  22  31  38  37  22 
1891  6  1  38  31  36  46  14  27  39  60  34  27  36  48    3  29  36  23  38  25 
1892  14  1  25  27  32  62  21  23  41  62  45  19  31  93    0  15  37  13  30  24 
1893  21  1  26  26  23  55  25  27  30  73  64  13  29  23    1  15  42  17  33  26 
1894  20  2  24  23  24  40  19  32  31  84  57  14  33  29    1  12  50  25  36  24 
1895  15  1  31  26  29  22  26  25  49  109  47  14  44  71    3  17  41  22  42  25 
1896  13  1  26  36  34  9  19  33  61  150  73  17  47  54    2  26  35  24  33  23 
1897  13  3  18  38  33  5  15  34  46  102  44  23  54  45    2  22  23  13  30  20 
1898  19  2  16  33  37  7  12  43  25  43  22  14  70  32    4  24  23  19  23  22 
1899  24  4  18  18  41  20  17  49  17  25  26  15  94  39    28  25  28  24  19  28 
1900  23  8  25  11  50  27  21  56  26  25  40  19  98  53    7  39  31  23  17  32 
1901  22  9  13  12  35  30  21  51  25  30  38  26  81  35    13  37  25  19  19  26 
1902  23  6  17  14  32  28  24  41  22  30  38  16  84  38    15  36  13  23  12  28 
1903  36  9  19  28  41  29  32  48  27  19  45  22  88  50    13  47  12  22  19  35 
1904  50  23  24  33  43  51  39  61  43  34  67  28  94  57  11  47  60  19  24  33  44 
1905  68  25  30  36  39  84  74  67  54  50  49  26  109  61  39  20  62  29  42  32  60 
1906  86  15  41  30  57  77  83  63  50  49  60  29  142  59  59  96  68  32  69  34  74 
1907  75  42  57  39  69  71  93  80  64  51  54  30  148  63  80  60  75  37  105  37  78 
1908  80  34  53  45  60  56  71  70  56  42  81  40  119  58  101  44  55  32  73  36  71 
1909  88  31  55  46  73  66  53  72  53  57  104  39  109  56  93  16  49  48  76  38  72 
1910  105  35  73  59  73  97  68  75  83  54  120  45  127  74  70  55  65  63  106  48  89 
1911  103  41  88  65  78  104  90  96  90  64  167  60  121  103  49  40  67  81  113  63  95 
1912  106  61  102  84  94  105  99  95  92  87  117  65  112  101  75  75  76  116  125  78  102 
1913  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
1914  59  49  49  92  67  78  59  96  67  66  51  125  47  79  75  24  78  61  52  70  59 
1915  29  22  17  67  40  113  23  61  48  29  39  92  24  67  61  2  43  60  29  57  34 
1916  27  21  22  55  37  190  42  56  46  37  79  69  33  110  56  5  62  85  29  57  44 
1917  21  29  26  55  22  210  47  71  42  33  385  62  44  96  48  57  66  140  33  51  47 
1918  24  48  21  35  19  147  65  57  21  25  267  40  55  61  53  63  82  132  25  33  44 
1919  34  53  40  57  26  162  56  97  45  47  103  68  75  83  34  26  103  91  52  47  56 
1920  62  53  69  170  71  338  62  123  83  83  186  220  135  171  46  126  175  233  63  106  102 
1921  91  112  72  181  96  284  86  119  119  151  142  386  242  197  68  29  210  375  73  128  126 
1922  80  69  67  154  62  110  76  178  76  120  130  197  143  59  23  29  104  134  78  134  88 
1923  119  108  65  192  79  183  95  189  93  165  320  272  141  113  33  28  161  143  93  162  111 
1924  131  115  94  225  109  236  111  202  212  223  222  192  162  182  49  58  189  210  97  243  135 
1925  150  122  119  311  111  224  127  173  211  229  354  168  187  213  57  76  211  156  145  388  157 
1926  163  129  97  413  94  132  198  155  236  257  272  147  185  132  49  58  211  130  129  695  160 
1927  170  118  96  477  117  168  127  168  195  258  363  179  170  136  61  52  198  170  150  651  157 
1928  208  138  111  486  163  119  110  229  200  258  396  208  186  202  82  88  164  156  166  559  169 
1929  244  162  130  466  191  123  171  219  186  252  333  254  200  184  81  118  187  113  203  721  196 
1930  196  131  78  227  84  87  206  178  125  115  276  271  231  163  127  81  139  73  289  571  164 
  
Graph 1. Aggregate investment of Latin America in machinery, 1890-1930, in 







































































































Graph 3. Indexes of capital formation in equipment goods of United States and 











































































































































































































































































































































Graph 6.  Tendency to convergence in the levels of investment per capita of the 
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    * Bolivia and Paraguay (see text) 
 
      
Graph 7.  Tendency to divergence in the levels of investment per capita of the 







0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0





















































Graph 8.  Tendency to convergence in the levels of investment per capita of the 
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* Bolivia and Paraguay (see text) 
 